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Traditional Marriage: Still Worth Defending 
George W. Dent, Jr.∗ 
A few years ago, I wrote an article entitled The Defense of 
Traditional Marriage.1 I began with the topic of same-sex marriage but 
soon saw that all the arguments for gay marriage were also arguments for 
polygamy, endogamy (or incestuous marriage), etc., so the article 
became a defense of traditional marriage against all these other types. 
The pertinent law and jurisprudence are constantly changing, so this 
conference offers an excellent opportunity to reconsider my views in 
light of new learning and thinking. A review shows the case for 
traditional marriage is even stronger now than it was before. As evidence 
has mounted and the glib arguments for same-sex marriage have drawn 
closer scrutiny, support for traditional marriage has expanded from its 
initial base, which was heavily concentrated in religious conservatives, 
by attracting growing numbers of religious and political moderates and 
liberals. 
I.  A LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE 
This article analyzes marriage from a liberal perspective. In liberal 
theory government should act only to achieve conventional social 
goods.2 The liberal approach is not dictated by the Constitution. 
 
This paper was presented at “The Future of Marriage and Claims for Same-Sex Unions Symposium” 
on August 29, 2003 at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, on the campus of Brigham Young 
University.  The article is part of this special symposium issue and the views expressed herein are 
those of the author and do not represent the views of the Journal of Public Law, the J. Reuben Clark 
Law School, or Brigham Young University. 
∗ Schott – van den Eynden Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. The 
author thanks Rick Garnett [&c] for their helpful comments. 
 1. 15 VA. J.L. & POL. 581 (1999). 
 2. “One characteristic of liberal societies is a commitment to the notion that—given the 
law’s inherently coercive potential—individual laws must have a sound normative justification in 
order to be regarded as morally legitimate.” Nicholas Bamforth, Same-Sex Partnerships and 
Arguments of Justice, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF 
NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 31, 31 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes, 
eds., 2001) (hereinafter “LEGAL RECOGNITION”). 
What constitutes “a sound normative justification” varies among cultures, so I refer herein to what 
are considered “conventional” social goods in liberal societies. This description is more accurate 
than the common assertion that liberalism dictates that government be morally “neutral.” See, e.g., 
M.C. Regan, Reason, Tradition and Family Law: A Comment on Social Constructionism, 79 VA. L. 
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Although the Constitution embraces some liberal principles, such as 
freedom of religion, it does not mandate the entire liberal program, 
although the Supreme Court sometimes imposes liberal standards to the 
Constitution of its own volition. Lawrence v. Texas,3 for example, 
applied a right of privacy analysis that the Court itself fabricated to strike 
down criminal sodomy statutes. The constitutional rationale for 
Lawrence was pure fiction, but the decision squares with liberal 
principles because the states had no persuasive justification for those 
statutes other than that homosexual acts are immoral. In liberal theory 
this rationale is not a legitimate basis for criminal punishment. 
Nothing in the Constitution should bar a state from denying 
recognition to same-sex unions simply because the state considers them 
intrinsically immoral. However, that justification will not persuade 
anyone who doesn’t already accept it. Accordingly, this Article makes 
the case for traditional marriage in terms of conventional social goods 
and without regard to the intrinsic morality of same-sex unions. 
II.  NORMS AND THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF LAW 
“Legal scholars have rediscovered social norms.”4 People’s norms 
(or values) are crucial to society’s success.5 The collapse of the Soviet 
empire, for instance, left populations without a stable set of norms.6 The 
result was disorder and decline. Further, for economic growth a modern 
 
REV. 1515, 1518 (1993) (stating that “neutrality liberalism” requires the state to be “neutral among 
different conceptions of the good life”). Liberalism is not morally neutral. See Patrick Neal, A 
Liberal Theory of the Good?, 17 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 567, 567 (1987) (“liberalism is not neutral with 
regard to the question of the good life”); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious 
Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls, 105 ETHICS 468, 477 (1995) (“Even a suitably 
circumscribed political liberalism . . . will in various ways promote a way of life as a whole.”). 
Indeed, moral neutrality is impossible. Government must affirm some norms and not others; it 
cannot support incompatible moral doctrines. Some liberals admit this. See Michael Perry, Religious 
Morality and Political Choice: Further Thoughts—and Second Thoughts—on Love and Power, 30 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 703, 708 (1993) (“the resolution of many of the political controversies that 
engage and divide us . . . requires recourse to moral beliefs that are inadmissible under the neutralist 
ideal”) (emphasis added); Susan H. Williams, Religion, Politics, and Feminist Epistemology: A 
Comment on the Uses and Abuses of Morality in Public Discourse, 77 IND. L.J. 267, 267 (2002) 
(“The use of contested moral frameworks in our political life is . . . simply inescapable . . . .”). 
 3. 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003). 
 4. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MONOCHROME SOCIETY 163 (2001). 
 5. “[A] social order based on laws can be maintained without massive coercion only if most 
people most of the time abide, as a result of supportive social norms, by the social tenets embedded 
in the law.” Id. at 171. 
 6. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF 
PROSPERITY 360-61 (1995); see also John Pomfret, In Beijing, a Scene Not Even Orwell Would 
Recognize, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2002, at B2 (stating that when Communism lost sway in China, it 
was “replaced by hedonism” and “naked self-interest. Thus the abandonment of communism 
means . . . farewell to all values and scruples.”) (quoting Hong Kong University Professor Wang 
Xiaoying). 
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society needs people who don’t just obey the law but who also practice 
traditional middle class virtues like work, thrift and delayed gratification. 
How can society cultivate desirable norms? One tool is the 
expressive function of law, by which government engages “in expressing 
social values and in encouraging social norms to move in particular 
directions.”7 This concept was just gaining purchase five years ago. 
People are more likely to cooperate if encouraged to do so by respected 
authority.8 One expressive use of law is to confer honor, a concept hardly 
acknowledged until recently. Now we even have books with titles such 
as Liberalism With Honor.9 By recognizing marriage the law gives it 
honor, thereby encouraging people to marry and stay married.10 
Recent findings in behavioral psychology point to the effects of law 
that fall under or are closely related to its expressive function. “Often 
people’s preferences are ill-informed, and their choices will inevitably be 
influenced by default rules, framing effects, and starting points.”11 
Similarly, “in the face of uncertainty, estimates are often made from an 
initial value, or ‘anchor,’ which is then adjusted to produce a final 
answer.”12 For example, in setting damage awards juries are influenced 
by the range of numbers suggested to them.13 If government treats 
traditional marriage as the norm, citizens are also more likely to view it 
that way than they would if government treats traditional marriage as but 
one of many equally valid choices. 
Although government cannot be completely morally neutral, liberal 
societies restrict the use of government to promote particular norms and 
instead leave individuals more moral autonomy than do authoritarian 
societies. Limiting the role of government as moral arbiter is especially 
appropriate when the state exerts compulsion, most notably in criminal 
 
 7. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 953 (1996). 
 8. See Lynn Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t 
Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board) 8 (Mar. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with UCLA School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series), at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=389407. 
 9. SHARON KRAUSE, LIBERALISM WITH HONOR (2002). 
 10. See also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault 
in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2526 (1994) (stating that the family serves “both as a 
mechanism for meeting the needs of family members and as a vehicle for expressing our values and 
aspirations about family life to ourselves and our children”); see generally Carol Weisbrod, On the 
Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991 (1989). 
 11. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron 1 
(Apr. 3, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with University of Chicago Law School) at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html. See also id. at 3-5, 10. 
 12. Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristic 3 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
University of Chicago Law School); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in DANIEL KAHNEMAN, ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (1982). 
 13. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 793 (2001). 
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law and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in taxation. Thus, to repeat, the 
Supreme Court’s invalidation of criminal sodomy laws was consistent 
with liberalism, even if it was not constitutionally justified. The 
legitimate scope of government action is broader in other contexts, 
including education and the expressive function of law. Thus, for 
example, the state can promote artistic activities of its choosing without 
having to support all artistic activity equally or all other leisure activities 
that some people favor. Similarly, by designating Rev. Martin Luther 
King’s birthday a national holiday, government can promote civil rights, 
which Dr. King championed, although it cannot levy taxes based on 
people’s attitudes about civil rights. 
The application of the constitutional prohibition of the establishment 
of religion14 to the expressive function of law is imprecise. The state 
cannot endorse religion, even though the endorsement has no material, 
tangible consequences for citizens. Thus government cannot exhibit 
holiday displays that promote one particular religion or religion 
generally.15 However, state acts are not unconstitutional simply because 
they happen to be congruent with some religious beliefs. Thus 
government can aid the needy, and require citizens to pay taxes for that 
aid, even though that aid conforms to duties in many religions to help the 
poor. Indeed, aid to the poor is itself a legitimate function of the liberal 
state; no further consequences are required to justify it. 
Perhaps, then, government can promote traditional marriage as an 
intrinsic good, an element of human flourishing. Certainly there is ample 
support for this view among philosophers and artists.16 Unlike criminal 
sodomy laws, legal validation of traditional marriage entails no illiberal 
judgment that homosexual acts or relationships are immoral any more 
than state support for the arts entails a judgment that those who watch 
commercial television are immoral. Nonetheless, some believe that 
same-sex marriage is just as meritorious as traditional marriage, or that 
marriage is not intrinsically good at all.17 Although a democratic majority 
can override this minority, the disagreement cannot be empirically 
resolved because it concerns norms, values.18 Even some who agree with 
 
 14. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
 15. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding 
that display on public property of a nativity scene was unconstitutional but a Jewish menorah was 
not). 
 16. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 73 and 81 and accompanying text. 
 18. See KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 53 (1947) (“It is impossible 
to derive norms or decisions from facts.”); ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 
194 (1987) (“Reason cannot establish values, and its belief that it can is the stupidest and most 
pernicious illusion.”); Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be 
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the majority prefer not to elevate their beliefs into law. Accordingly, in 
pursuit of a broader consensus, this article will focus primarily on the 
more conventional, less controversial human goods that traditional 
marriage promotes, rather than relying on the view that traditional 
marriage is intrinsically good. 
Although by definition the expressive function of law has little or no 
tangible, material consequences, people of all political views appreciate 
its importance. Thus opposing groups battle furiously about whether the 
Confederate flag will fly over the South Carolina statehouse. The battle 
is important because, despite widespread skepticism about government, 
most people still have some respect for it and, by such symbolic acts, the 
state can influence people’s attitudes. Although the impact is minimal on 
those who feel strongly about the relevant issue, the effect can be 
substantial on those who are conflicted. Further, when many people are 
ambivalent and the symbolic acts of government change some people’s 
views, those people may also influence the attitudes of their friends and 
neighbors. Thus by its expressive function government can trigger a 
“norm cascade”19 or chain reaction.20 In the last several decades public 
attitudes about race and gender have changed profoundly due largely to 
campaigns of public exhortation led by the expressive and educational 
function of government. 
Many advocate recognition of same-sex marriages because of the 
tangible, material legal benefits it would confer. This rationale has two 
weaknesses. First, the tangible legal benefits of marriage are paltry. Most 
of the legal consequences of marriage (like inheritance of property) can 
be achieved by private acts (like writing a will) without great effort. 
Indeed, for many people the main legal incident of marriage is subjection 
to the “marriage penalty” in the federal income tax.21 The lack of 
tangible legal benefits to marriage undoubtedly helps to explain the small 
 
Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 421-22 n.60 (1992) (stating that government must make 
decisions concerning many controversial moral issues that cannot be decided on empirical grounds). 
 19. See Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, supra note 12, at 8. 
 20. See Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Trust, and Law, in THE MORAL SENTIMENTS: ORIGINS, 
EVIDENCE, AND POLICY  Chapter 12 (Herbert Gintis et al. eds., forthcoming 2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=361400 (titled: The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, 
Collective Action, and Law). 
 21. See James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, For Love or Money? The Impact of Taxes on 
Marriage, 66 ECONOMICA 297 (1999) (marriage penalty tax reduces the marriage rate); Richard L. 
Elbert, Love, God, and Country: Religious Freedom and the Marriage Penalty Tax, 5 SETON HALL 
CONST. L.J. 1171, 1174-85 (1995) (describing history and status of the penalty); Richard B. 
Malamud, Allocation of the Joint Return Marriage Penalty and Bonus, 15 VA. TAX REV. 489 
(1996); C. Eugene Steurle, Valuing Marital Commitment: The Radical Restructuring of Our Tax and 
Transfer Systems, 9 RESPONSIVE COMM. 35 (1999) (finding an “extraordinary array of marriage 
[tax] penalties”). 
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numbers of same-sex couples who have married in places where their 
marriages would be valid.22 
For some gay couples there would be tangible benefits that would 
motivate them to marry, but that is a dubious basis on which to validate 
same-sex marriage. Because gay couples do not bear children and do not 
have the traditional religious and cultural encouragements to marry, and 
because the majority of gays who are male tend to be promiscuous, many 
gay marriages would be marriages of convenience entered into primarily 
for the tangible benefits.23 Indeed, the parties would not have to be 
homosexual or even committed to each other; “two heterosexuals of the 
same sex might marry as a way of obtaining financial benefits.”24 
Marriages of convenience can be entered into now between a man and a 
woman, but they cause little damage to the esteem for marriage because 
they are viewed as rare exceptions to an honored tradition. Gay 
marriages of convenience would be more harmful because they would be 
viewed particularly offensive examples of a noxious theme. 
Further, if there are particular legal difficulties faced by gay couples 
that should be removed, this can be done on an ad hoc basis. This 
approach makes more sense because these problems are not typically 
restricted to gay couples, and neither should the solutions. For example, 
perhaps visiting privileges should be given to same-sex partners of 
hospital patients. However, there is no need to tie this to marital status or 
to restrict it to homosexual companions. Why not permit patients to 
designate companions for visiting privileges regardless of whether the 
two are married? 
Some supporters of same-sex marriage candidly admit that the main 
prize in this contest is not the tangible, material benefits but the 
expressive, symbolic effect of legal recognition. Evan Wolfson, for 
instance, notes “marriage’s central symbolic importance in our society 
 
 22. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. In three years only 6,500 couples took 
advantage of Vermont’s civil union law. See Pam Belluck, Gays Respond: ‘I Do,’ ‘I Might and ‘I 
Won’t’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2003, at A1. Of 1.3 million employees of General Motors, only 166 
claimed the benefits for a same-sex partner that GM offers. See Maggie Gallagher, What Is Marriage 
For, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 4/Aug 11, 2003, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, The Weekly 
Standard File. Interviews with about 20 gay couples shortly after the recent Massachusetts decision 
validating same-sex marriages revealed general ambivalence about the desirability of marriage. See 
Belluck, supra, at A1. “[C]ouples who came of age in the 1960’s and 1970’s [tended] to see 
marriage as a heterosexual institution, symbolizing a system that they could not, or would not, want 
to be part of.” Id. 
 23. See Stanley N. Kurtz, What Is Wrong with Gay Marriage, COMMENT., Sept., 2000, at 35, 
39 (“many homosexuals who disdain the idea of conventional marriage or even ‘commitment 
ceremonies’ would nonetheless marry for the ‘bennies’—that is, the legal and financial benefits 
involved”) (citation omitted). 
 24. Stanley Kurtz, Beyond Gay Marriage, WEEKLY STANDARD, Aug. 4/Aug. 11, 2003, at 26, 
32 (citation omitted) available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, The Weekly Standard File. 
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and culture” and the “transformational potential of gay people’s 
inclusion . . . in marriage.”25 
Some gay activists laud the institution of marriage and predict that 
recognition of same-sex marriages would boost its sagging prestige. 
Andrew Sullivan says it would “buttress the ethic of heterosexual 
marriage, by showing how even those excluded from it can wish to 
model themselves on its shape and structure.”26 
It seems unlikely, though, that recognizing same-sex marriage would 
raise esteem for marriage in the eyes of most people. First, most 
Americans consider gay marriage a “mocking burlesque”27 or “mere 
parody” of the real thing.28 Despite his claim that validating gay marriage 
would “buttress the ethic of heterosexual marriage,” Andrew Sullivan 
later concedes that “[e]ven those tolerant of homosexuals may find this 
institution [marriage] so wedded to the notion of heterosexual 
commitment that to extend it would be to undo its very essence.”29 
Recognizing gay marriage would impair the honor conferred on the 
institution. Neither America nor, with a few recent exceptions, any other 
society in history has recognized gay marriage. Most cultures have, at 
best, frowned on homosexuality. Many cultures, including those 
influenced by Christianity, Judaism and Islam, have considered it a sin 
and, often, a crime. Most Americans would consider gay marriages a 
caricature of the real thing or even an insult to a relationship that they 
consider to have a sacred as well as a legal dimension.30 Even if one 
opposes that view, it is a fact we must acknowledge, just as we would 
have to note the rejection of pork in formulating a food policy for Jewish 
or Muslim populations. 
 
 25. Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay 
Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 567, 580 (1994-95); see 
also Janet Halley, Recognition, Rights, Regulation, Normalisation: Rhetorics of Justification in the 
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, in LEGAL RECOGNITION, supra note 2, at 97, 98 (“[T]he legal refusal of 
same-sex marriage, in a world in which cross-sex marriage is not only permitted but applauded, 
deprecates same-sex relationships—devalues them, delegitimizes them. This derogation is the target 
of the Recognition justification of same-sex marriage . . . .”). 
 26. See ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT 
HOMOSEXUALITY 112 (1995). 
 27. Hadley Arkes, The Closet Straight, NAT’L REV., July 5, 1993, at 43, 45. 
 28. James Q. Wilson, Against Homosexual Marriage, COMMENT., March, 1996, at 34, 36 
(quoting Kenneth Minogue’s book review of Virtually Normal in the National Review). 
 29. Sullivan, supra note 26, at 179. 
 30. Marriage is one of the traditional Christian sacraments. Further, praise (and guilt) 
depreciate if overused. See WILLIAM J. GOODE, THE CELEBRATION OF HEROES: PRESTIGE AS A 
CONTROL SYSTEM 46-48 (1978) (stating that prestige is governed by laws of supply and demand); 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Human Nature and the Best Consequentialist Moral System 31-32 
(2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Harvard Law School’s Center for Law Economics, and 
Business), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=304384. Thus, extending legal recognition to other forms of 
marriage would make traditional marriage cease to be special, something particularly honorable. 
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Many advocates of gay marriage acknowledge that it could lower 
esteem for marriage. Nan Hunter says that validating same-sex marriages 
could “destabilize the cultural meaning of marriage.”31 Janet Halley 
predicts similar consequences: 
[R]ecognition of same-sex marriage might lend momentum to the long-
running erosion of the specialness of marriage. No longer privileged by 
restriction to some unions and deprived of its power to send the 
message that those unions are particularly good, marriage might 
become less, not more, meaningful. Cross-sex couples could lose 
interest in marriage as a result, opting to co-habit rather than to marry. 
Pro-marriage voting strength could erode; the social consensus that it is 
worthwhile to devote public and private resources to “support 
marriage” could break up. If this happens, rather than a convergence of 
same-sex with cross-sex couples in maintaining the centrality and thus 
the normalising power of marriage, “mere” recognition will have 
contributed to the end of marriage’s centrality as a mode of social 
ordering.32 
Similarly, Gretchen Stiers says: “Two women or two men who marry 
subvert the belief that women and men take on separate but 
complementary roles with marriage. . . .”33 
Some predict that the overwhelming opposition to gay marriage will 
evaporate just as opposition to racial integration and interracial marriage 
has abated. These prophets grossly misconstrue the nature of attitudes 
about race and homosexuality. Laws banning racial integration and 
miscegenation were rare in Christendom and even the exception in 
America when the Supreme Court struck down these laws in the 1950’s 
and ‘60’s.34 By contrast, with rare recent exceptions no society has ever 
recognized same-sex marriages. 
Further, racial segregation and discrimination have long been 
condemned by Christianity. St. Paul said that in Christianity “there is 
 
 31. Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9, 
11 (1991). 
 32. Halley, supra note 25, at 101 (emphasis in original). She adds that legal recognition of 
domestic partnerships, 
when it is equally available to cross-sex and same-sex couples, may render marriage a 
little bit less paradigmatic. Under both regimes marriage no longer normalises all sexual 
relationships: the marriage substitute does too, and since marriage and the marriage 
substitute are different in other ways (the latter is easier to dissolve, less loaded with 
traditional expectations, free of religious jurisdiction, etc.), introduction of the latter 
significantly diminishes the hegemonic posture of marriage. 
Id. at 103. 
 33. See Kurtz, supra note 23, at 39 (citation omitted). 
 34. Fewer than one-third of the states had anti-miscegenation laws when the Supreme Court 
struck them down in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE 
CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 120-21 (1996). 
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neither Greek nor Jew, . . . Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free; but Christ 
is all, and in all.”35 Ethnic friction is ubiquitous throughout history and 
perhaps biologically programmed in humans, so of course Christians 
have often discriminated by race despite church doctrine. In America, 
some Southern churches not only tolerated racial segregation but also 
sought to justify it with Christian doctrine, but this was essentially a local 
aberration that found little support in churches elsewhere. By contrast, 
Christianity and its predecessor, Judaism, have consistently condemned 
homosexual acts as serious sins for almost 3,000 years. Only a few 
branches of Christianity and Judaism now condone homosexual 
partnerships, and they have come to this position only recently, yet this 
view is firmly rejected by most Christians. 
In sum, anti-miscegenation laws and all racial discrimination violate 
basic, long-standing Judeo-Christian principles, but non-recognition of 
same-sex marriage (and disapproval of all homosexual conduct) have 
always been integral to these principles. The attempt to equate the two 
within the Western cultural tradition is specious. 
Validating gay marriage would probably not bring a plethora of 
stable marriages that would change public opinion.36 Again, the tangible 
material benefits of marriage for most people are negligible and often 
outweighed by the detriments, including the marriage tax penalty. 
Although many lesbian relationships are durable, gay male relationships 
rarely are, and gay males are far more numerous than lesbians.37 Gay 
couples do not bear children and there is no religious or social tradition 
discouraging divorce among gays, thus divorce is likely to be common. 
The example set by same-sex marriages is likely to be that getting 
married is not important and, for those who do marry, divorce is no big 
deal. 
Admittedly, we cannot be completely certain of the effects of 
recognizing gay marriage unless we try it.38 Some suggest that “We 
 
 35. Colossians 3:9. 
 36. See Symposium, Has the Supreme Court Gone Too Far?, COMMENT., Oct. 2003, at 25, 
48 (comments of James Q. Wilson) (“In the Netherlands, which legalized same-sex marriages in 
2001, fewer than 10 percent of an estimated 50,000 same-sex couples have chosen marriage. In 2002 
there were 1,900 such marriages, compared with 85,500 male-female ones.”). 
 37. A recent study in the Netherlands, where gay marriages are legally valid, found that gay 
male partnerships lasted on average 1.5 years and that men in these partnerships had an average of 
eight casual sexual partners per year. Maria Xiridou, et al., The Contribution of Steady and Casual 
Partnerships to the Incidence of HIV Infection Among Homosexual Men in Amsterdam, 17 AIDS 
1029, 1031 (2003). 
 38. Even then measuring social phenomena and identifying their causes are often 
controversial. Validating same-sex marriages would likely lead to disputes about whether it 
“worked,” just as there are debates about whether other government programs “work.” 
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ought to pull the pin and see what happens,”39 but this approach would 
be reckless. It may seem unfair to, in effect, place the burden of proof on 
advocates of gay marriage and then deny them an opportunity to sustain 
that burden. However, validating gay marriage could be detrimental, 
especially to children.40 Until recently the validation of same-sex 
marriages has never been tried by any society. Some European countries 
are now experimenting with recognition. If their experiences show that 
marriage becomes more popular and more stable, supporters will have a 
better argument for trying it here. 
III.  THE BENEFITS OF TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE 
A.  Inferences from the Universality of Marriage 
Very few social institutions are found in all cultures throughout 
history. Heterosexual marriage is one of the few. This fact alone argues 
that heterosexual marriage is important to the survival of a culture.41 
Some aspects of marriage in modern Western cultures may not be 
universal. The so-called “nuclear family,” comprising a married couple 
and their minor children, has been called a recent development, with the 
implication that such a state may be a mutation that never was, or no 
longer is, socially beneficial. Recent learning shows, however, that the 
nuclear family is not a Victorian innovation but has been dominant for 
centuries, at least in Western cultures.42 During this period Western 
civilization has led the advance of democracy, human rights, science, and 
economic growth. It would be rash to tamper with traditional marriage 
until its role in these developments is better understood. 
B.  Benefits to Children 
Traditional marriage is the best context for rearing children. 
Although this seems axiomatic to most people, many critics questioned 
the accuracy of this concept. Accordingly, social scientists set out to test 
the hypothesis empirically. The initial stream of studies confirming the 
benefits of traditional marriage to children has now swelled to a torrent. 
By every measure—physical and mental health, academic performance, 
 
 39. Christine Pierce, Gay Marriage, 26 J. SOCIAL PHIL. 2, 5, 10 (1995). 
 40. See infra Part III. 
 41. See David P. Schmitt et al., Universal Sex Differences in the Desire for Sexual Variety: 
Tests from 52 Nations, 6 Continents, and 13 Islands, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 85, 100 
(2003) (stating that “random pancultural development, although possible, is extremely unlikely”); 
see also LEE CRONK, THAT COMPLEX WHOLE: CULTURE AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR (1999). 
 42. See Joan Acocella, Little People, NEW YORKER, Aug. 18 & 25, 2003, at 138, 139. 
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social adjustment, and obedience to law—children raised by their 
biological parents who are married and live together fare better than 
other children.43 The evidence is so overwhelming that the marriage 
movement, which seeks to shore up traditional marriage, has expanded 
beyond religious conservatives to include many moderates and liberals.44 
The growing appreciation of the benefits of traditional marriage to 
children coincides with changing attitudes about the government’s 
treatment of children. This issue has always been a difficult one for 
liberal societies. Unlike normal adults, children can’t care for 
themselves. However, Western social traditions, based on Judeo-
Christian beliefs of parental control of children combined with 
America’s particularly strong skepticism about the ability of government 
to intervene beneficially in personal affairs, produce an attitude that the 
state should interfere with families only in egregious cases of abuse or 
neglect. This attitude became less tenable as the breakdown of the 
traditional family left more and more children poorly cared for.45 
Although some belittle the traditional family as an anachronism, a 
relic of a simpler age, “[o]ur nation’s contemporary political and 
economic institutions depend even more than before on citizens who 
embrace the values and virtues fostered by the nuclear family.”46 
Children are society’s future, so people in all cultures care about children 
for the community’s sake, not just for the children’s. However, in pre-
modern cultures it was enough that children learn to handle a plow, or 
needle and thread, and not to be criminals. This no longer suffices. Now 
we need children to acquire advanced education and social habits. Thirty 
years ago a high-school education was considered adequate for middle-
 
 43. See Blain Hardin, 2-Parent Families Rise After Change in Welfare Laws, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 12, 2001, at A1: 
a powerful consensus has emerged in recent years among social scientists . . . . It sees 
single-parent families as the dismal foundries that produced decades of child poverty, 
delinquency, and crime. . . . From a child’s point of view, according to a growing body of 
social research, the most supportive household is one with two biological parents in a 
low-conflict marriage. 
 44. See Isabel v. Sawhill, The Behavioral Aspects of Poverty, PUB. INTEREST, Fall, 2003, at 
79, 87-88 (“As evidence of the benefits to children of growing up in a two-parent family has 
strengthened, liberals have become less likely to question the value of marriage.”); David 
Blankenhorn, The Marriage Problem 2 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
Blankenhorn cites, inter alia, Hardin, supra note 43; Maureen Freely, THE OBSERVER (London), 
Nov. 19, 2001, at 1 (reporting that “the pro-marriage movement is gaining strength on both sides of 
the Atlantic”). 
 45. The percentage of American families with children under eighteen that were headed by 
married couples reached a record low in the middle to late 1990’s and has started to rise in the last 
few years. See Blankenhorn, supra note 44, at 3-4 (citing various studies). 
 46. W. Bradford Wilcox, Family Ties, PUB. INTEREST, Fall, 2003, at 115, 118 (summarizing 
a theme from BRIGITTE BERGER, THE FAMILY IN THE MODERN AGE: MORE THAN A LIFESTYLE 
CHOICE (2003)). 
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class children and “decent jobs for unskilled and semi-skilled labor were 
readily available. Today, such jobs are much harder to find, and college 
is considered a necessity.”47 Not surprisingly, then, “the cost of having 
children has risen much faster than the cost of being childless” and 
“compared with people who don’t have children, people who do are in 
worse economic shape than they’ve ever been in.”48 
Here recent learning is relevant. The dismal academic performance 
of many American children was long blamed on poor schools. Although 
the quality of the school is important, in recent years educators have 
realized that children can’t excel academically, no matter how good the 
school, if they don’t begin school at least receptive to a disciplined 
atmosphere and to reading and math as a result of their home 
environment, or if when school-aged they get no educational support and 
no stimulation, or the wrong kind of stimulation, at home. The most 
important place of learning is not the school but the home. Not 
surprisingly, the best parental support tends to be given to children who 
live with both their natural parents, and this scenario is most likely to 
exist if the parents were married when the child was conceived and born 
and remain married afterward. 
The renewed appreciation of the importance of norms is also 
significant. It compels us to grapple with the fact that norms cannot be 
taught in school alone. Indeed, norms aren’t taught at all in the way that 
math and history are. Rather they are habits children acquire by 
practicing what they see done by the people around them.49 Parents are 
crucial in this regard, not only for what they convey to their own children 
but also for what they contribute to their whole neighborhood. We have 
come to appreciate that what a child sees in her community can reinforce 
or undermine good norms. 
We also understand better now the importance of the traditional 
family to child rearing. Even adoption by a traditional married couple is 
generally inferior to living with one’s natural parents. Single-parenting is 
less satisfactory.50 Divorce does great and lasting harm to children.51 
Good parenting requires hard work from two dedicated people, and those 
most likely to accept this difficult task are the biological parents. 
 
 47. James Surowicki, Leave No Parent Behind, NEW YORKER, Aug. 18 & 25, 2003, at 48. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 8, at 21 (“a predisposition to behave in an other-regarding 
fashion is something that is largely acquired through experience”); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 
30, at 8 & n.12 (“moral behavior can become a habit,” (citing Hume, Mill & Darwin)). 
 50. See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 59-60 (2000) (cataloguing the problems stemming from illegitimacy 
and single-parenting). 
 51. See id. at 174-77. 
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Many parents will nurture their children no matter what the state 
does, but as many others will not do so, the state should promote good 
parenting and, since marriage correlates with good parenting, the state 
should also promote marriage. This task is not easy: “Though marriage 
has a number of important benefits, especially for children, it is not 
presently clear what can be done to encourage it.”52 Neither is it clear 
what can be done to encourage married couples to be attentive parents. 
One option to this end is to give parents money. New York City now 
pays parents of school children to get involved in their children’s 
education.53 This program is a commendable recognition that good 
parenting is indispensable, yet clear obstacles impair the program’s 
success. It is impossible to monitor closely the parents’ compliance. 
Good care is so time-consuming that even a program of low hourly 
payments would be immensely expensive. 
Further, recent learning in behavioral psychology shows that 
“manipulating material incentives may not only be an inefficient 
regulatory strategy for solving collective action problems; it may often 
be a self-defeating one.”54 People tend to follow social norms if they 
believe that most others are doing likewise. In such cases, “reliance on 
costly incentive schemes becomes less necessary.”55 But “[c]onspicuous 
rewards and punishments can imply that others aren’t inclined to 
cooperate voluntarily, a message that predictably weakens individuals’ 
commitment to contributing to public goods.”56 
In short, if we define the rational man as homo economicus—a 
wealth-maximizing individual—then having and conscientiously raising 
children is not rational. To encourage good parenting, society must stress 
non-economic motives, like honor. For similar reasons, treating marriage 
as a contractual relationship is inappropriate. It is better treated as a 
“covenant [which] implies unconditional love and permanence” because 
children suffer if parents separate or do not act lovingly. 57 An alternative 
to material incentives is the expressive function of law.58 By conferring 
honor on marriage the law promotes that institution which maximizes the 
likelihood that parents will give their children good care. By contrast, 
 
 52. Sawhill, supra note 44, at 88. 
 53. See Elissa Gootman, In Gamble, New York Schools Pay to Get Parents Involved, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2003, at A1. 
 54. Kahan, supra note 20, at 2. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. BRINIG, supra note 50, at 6. 
 58. See supra notes 7-10, 19-20 and accompanying text. 
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recognizing same-sex marriage will sever the connection between 
marriage and child-rearing.59 
Some object that this emphasis on child-rearing is archaic because 
marriage is now properly seen primarily as an institution for the 
emotional fulfillment of the spouses, not for reproduction. First, note that 
I’m only talking about why marriage concerns the law. People find 
fulfillment in many human relationships, such as drinking buddies and 
bridge groups. However, the law generally leaves these to be handled 
privately. Marriage is different largely because of its importance to 
children, who cannot protect their own interests within the family as 
drinking buddies and members of bridge groups can. 
Critics also argue that the emphasis on children is logically 
inconsistent because the law recognizes childless marriages.60 However, 
even newlyweds who intend to be childless can, and often do, change 
their minds. As for couples incapable of having children, it is often 
difficult to identify them even after intrusive medical examination, which 
in any case would be repugnant to our legal and social traditions.61 
What about the rare cases in which it is obvious, say because of age, 
that a marrying couple can never bear children. First, rules of eligibility 
for a legal status are usually not finely drawn. We set the rules for when 
people can vote or drive a car, for instance, based on when most people 
can handle these activities. We don’t make individual determinations of 
maturity. Second, to be effective social norms must be fairly simple.62 
Consider the Ten Commandments. Most ethicists and theologians agree 
that there are situations where it is morally permissible, even morally 
necessary, to lie or to steal. But the text of the Ten Commandments 
doesn’t get into unusual exceptions, and neither should the law, at least 
in its expressive function. Third, if one of the couples is capable of 
procreating, a marriage helps to ensure that that spouse will not produce 
a child out of wedlock. 
Further, what is the objection to recognizing marriages of people 
who can’t have children? These marriages serve as an inspiration: Even 
 
 59. See Maggie Gallagher, The Stakes, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, (July 14, 2003), at 
http://www.nationalreview.com (“Marriage will no longer be a carrier of the message that children 
need mothers and fathers.”). 
 60. Evan Wolfson, Enough Marriage to Share: A Response to Maggie Gallagher, in 
MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX UNIONS: A DEBATE 25, 27 (Lynn D. Wardle et al. eds., 2003). 
 61. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (striking down law banning 
sale of contraceptives in part because it was “repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the 
marriage relationship”). 
 62. See STEVEN SHAVELL, WELFARE ECONOMICS, MORALITY, AND THE LAW (forthcoming); 
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 30, at 11 (“moral rules must have some degree of generality”); see 
also Richard A. Posner, Wedding Bell Blues, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 22, 2003, at 33 (“The law 
frequently and unexceptionably draws crude lines.”). 
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though they can’t have children, these couples still choose to marry. The 
message these marriages convey is that, a fortiori, those who can and 
want to have children ought to marry. That is the exact opposite of the 
message created by people who shun traditional marriage and prefer a 
relationship that is inherently sterile. 
C.  Encouraging Heterosexuality 
Good child rearing is the most important reason, but not the only 
reason for the law to care about marriage. By honoring traditional 
marriage the law may nudge a few people toward a heterosexual rather 
than a homosexual life. The number is probably small because we know 
that a homosexual life is not casually chosen; there are strong 
disincentives to that choice. On the other hand, we know that sexual 
orientation (much less sexual behavior) is not immutable.63 Homosexual 
conduct is much more common in societies that condone it than in 
societies that condemn and punish it.64 Also, many men who have been 
exclusively heterosexual will engage in homosexual acts if they can 
when placed in an all-male environment (like prison or the military), and 
then revert to exclusive heterosexuality when they leave that 
environment. Even if public policy grants no moral or metaphysical 
superiority to heterosexuality, the health risks of homosexuality alone 
justify the state in discouraging it. 
Because there are more male than female homosexuals,65 validating 
gay marriage would remove more men than women from the market for 
traditional marriage. Although the numerical impact would be minor, it 
would harm women by exacerbating the existing shortage of 
marriageable males. That shortage is already pronounced in some social 
 
 63. Kinsey, for example, found that sexual orientation is not bipolar, but covers a range from 
strong heterosexual preference through neutrality to strong homosexual preference. ALFRED C. 
KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 638-41 (1948); see also ALAN P. BELL & 
MARTIN S. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES: A STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN 53-
61 (1978); RICHARD C. FRIEDMAN, MALE HOMOSEXUALITY: A CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOANALYTIC 
PERSPECTIVE 3 (1988). Further, some psychiatrists believe that some homosexuals can change their 
sexual orientation. See Robert Spitzer, Can Some Gay Men and Lesbians Change Their Sexual 
Orientation? 200 Participants Reporting a Change from Homosexual to Heterosexual Orientation, 
32 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 403 (Oct. 2003). 
 64. See I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOMOSEXUALITY 578-80 (Walter R. Dynes ed., 1990) 
(describing the impact of social attitudes on homosexual conduct). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, 
SEX AND REASON 117 (1992) (stating that, in societies intolerant of homosexuality, more men with 
homosexual inclinations will enter traditional marriages). 
 65. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 99 (1992); ROBERT T. MICHAEL ET AL., SEX 
IN AMERICA: A DEFINITIVE SURVEY 176 (1994) (finding that 2.8% of adult males and 1.4% of adult 
females are predominantly homosexual); EDWARD O. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY 297 (1994). 
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groups.66 Even where the disparity is small it places women at a 
disadvantage. As anyone who has played musical chairs knows, even a 
slight excess of demand over supply can be troublesome when demand is 
inflexible. Demand for marriage is inflexible; there is no substitute for it, 
and most people do not want to forgo having children. 
With numbers in their favor, men know they need not make a 
commitment to one woman; the reluctance of modern men to make a 
commitment is now legendary. In light of the benefits of marriage to 
men,67 this reluctance is foolish. However, that is not surprising; people 
often misconstrue and fail to act in their own best interests.68 The 
shortage of marriageable males also places married women at a 
disadvantage by making it easier for husbands to re-marry after a divorce 
than it is for wives. 
D.  Socializing Adults 
A third reason for the law to be concerned about marriage is to 
socialize adults. Marriage channels potentially destructive energy into 
beneficial activity, especially for men. Crime and drug abuse are 
committed more by single men than by women or married men.69 In all 
cultures men are more promiscuous than women.70 Some believe that 
recognizing same-sex marriage would, as William Eskridge puts it, 
“civilize gay men by making them more like lesbians.”71 
That is unlikely: men are not domesticated by a wedding but by 
women and children.72 Indeed, some advocate recognition of gay 
 
 66. See POSNER, supra note 65, at 136-41 (“In America today black women significantly 
outnumber available black men.”). 
 67. See infra notes 69 & 76 and accompanying text. 
 68. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. 
 69. The incarceration rate for young single men is nearly seven times that of young married 
men. GEORGE AKERLOF, MEN WITHOUT CHILDREN (1997). Men may be genetically harder to 
socialize than women. See Natalie Angier, Parental Origins of Chromosome May Determine Social 
Graces, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1997, at A2 (reporting a study finding that girls lacking 
an X chromosome from their fathers were more anti-social; this suggests that the higher frequency of 
anti-social behavior in males, who get a Y rather than an X chromosome from their fathers, has a 
genetic basis). 
 70. See Schmitt, supra note 41, at 101 (“the largest and most comprehensive test yet 
conducted on whether the sexes differ in the desire for sexual variety” concluded: “Men not only 
possess a greater desire than women do for a variety of sexual partners, men also require less time to 
elapse than women do before consenting to sexual intercourse, and men tend to more actively seek 
short-term mateships than women do.”). 
 71. ESKRIDGE, supra note 34, at 85. 
 72. See GEORGE GILDER, MEN AND MARRIAGE 76 (1993); POSNER, supra note 65, at 305-07, 
312 (stating that the presence of children helps to keep married couples together); Hadley Arkes, The 
Closet Straight, NAT’L REV., July 5, 1993, at 32. This is consistent with evidence that lesbians are 
less promiscuous and more often achieve long-term relationships than gay men. See ESKRIDGE, 
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marriages precisely because it would undermine what they see as a 
stifling, repressive institution.73 Some claim gay men are promiscuous 
and have few lasting relationships because of social oppression; if they 
were accepted, they would have the same rate of stable marriages as 
normal couples. But social acceptance of gays has been rising for many 
years now, yet we see no evidence of domestication. On the contrary, we 
now see an increase of unsafe sex and new HIV infections. “If ‘a grisly 
plague has not furthered the cause of homosexual monogamy,’ why 
would ‘a permit from the town clerk.’”74 
E.  Promoting Human Flourishing 
A (distant) fourth reason for the law to care about marriage is to 
promote individual flourishing. Many philosophers, theologians, writers 
and artists in various eras and corners of the globe have considered a 
loving (traditional) marriage to be one of the highest human goods. As 
Steven Carter says, “Most people . . . see the value of children or the 
horror of murder without the need for explanation. It is not merely an 
instinct but part of their vision of the good.”75 However, one need not 
resort to such metaphysical judgments; more mundane factors will do. 
Married people live longer and enjoy better physical and psychological 
health and greater wealth.76 
Some acknowledge these benefits but claim that validating gay 
marriages will do no damage and indeed that marriage will profit from 
the support of homosexuals and the good example set by gay marriages. 
That is highly dubious. As already noted, most people view gay marriage 
as a travesty or an outrage.77 At least among gay men, enduring marriage 
 
supra note 34, at 83 (“The majority of surveys taken in the last twenty years have found more 
lesbians than gay men in committed long-term relationships.”). 
 73. See URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY AND LESBIAN 
LIBERATION 208 (1995) (advocating gay marriage in order to “assimilate the straight world to the 
gay world”); Michelangelo Signorile, Bridal Wave, OUT, Dec.-Jan., 1994, at 161 (arguing for same-
sex marriage in order “to debunk a myth and radically alter an archaic institution”). 
 74. WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE BROKEN HEARTH: REVERSING THE MORAL COLLAPSE OF THE 
AMERICAN FAMILY 117 (2001) (quoting Mark Steyn). 
 75. Stephen L. Carter, Liberal Hegemony and Religious Resistance: An Essay on Legal 
Theory, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 25 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 
2001) (hereinafter cited as “CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES”). 
 76. See Linda J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483 (1995); Hara Estroff 
Marano, Debunking the Marriage Myth: It Works for Women, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1998, at F1 
(citing findings that for both men and women marriage “lengthens life, substantially boosts physical 
and emotional health and raises income over that of single or divorced people or those who live 
together”); Marriage Dividend, BUS. WK., Oct. 6, 2003, at 158 (citing recent study of older women 
showing that married women enjoyed better health than single women). These phenomena are 
observed in other countries, too. See Steven Stack & J. Ross Eshleman, Marital Status and 
Happiness: A 17-Nation Study, 60 J. MARRIAGE. & FAM. 527 (1998). 
 77. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
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is likely to be rare.78 Many gay activists admit that gay marriages are 
likely to be shorter.79 The law then would encounter pressure to relax 
divorce standards to accommodate this. As for the example set by gay 
marriages, it is likely to be that marriage is usually brief, casually 
terminated, not to be taken too seriously. Extending valid marriage to “an 
often openly and even proudly promiscuous population would fatally 
undermine an already weak institution by breaking the bond between 
marriage and the principle of monogamy.”80 
F.  Gender and Class Equality 
Some gay activists oppose traditional marriage as a stifling, 
oppressive institution and yearn for its de-normalization. Many feminists 
believe that “the historically patriarchal function and property 
associations of marriage render it incapable of offering a route to 
liberation or equality.”81 This opposition is misguided. Although men 
seem to gain more from marriage than women do, women might suffer 
more from validation of gay marriage. 
Allegations of “the historically patriarchal function and property 
associations of marriage” are also flawed. Christianity spread in the 
Roman Empire in part because it gave women better treatment than they 
received under prevailing customs, in which women, generally, had few 
rights, while married women had even fewer rights and could be casually 
cast off by their husbands.82 Most Christian denominations now affirm 
that “[m]en and women are equal as persons.”83 Many husbands do 
unfairly dominate their wives, but it does not follow that institution of 
marriage causes this domination. As men have dominated women 
 
 78. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family 
Values by a “Simulacrum of Marriage,” 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1726 (1998) (conceding that 
marriage may not have “the same meaning—entailing commitment to the same values—for gay 
people as for their heterosexual counterparts”). 
 80. Kurtz, supra note 23, at 36 (citing William J. Bennett). 
 81. Davina Cooper, Like Counting Stars?: Re-Structuring Equality and the Socio-Legal 
Space of Same-Sex Marriage, in LEGAL RECOGNITION, supra note 2, at 75, 75; see also CAROL 
SMART, THE TIES THAT BIND: LAW, MARRIAGE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF PATRIARCHAL 
RELATIONS 146 (1984); Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 
1997). 
 82. St. Paul declared that, in Christianity, “The wife hath not power of her own body, but the 
husband; and likewise also the husband hath not power of his own body, but the wife.” 1 
Corinthians 7:4. (Christianity treated women better than Romans). 
 83. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Considerations Regarding Proposals To Give 
Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons 2 (Jun 3, 2003), at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_h
omosexual-unions_en.html. 
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throughout history in all societies, it would be astonishing if equality of 
the spouses were the rule in America today. 
However, traditional marriage reduces rather than exacerbates 
inequality: “the intensely conjugal and domestic orientation of the 
nuclear family resulted in a high measure of sexual equality and child-
centeredness.”84 Women have suffered more than men from relaxed 
standards for divorce and are likely to suffer more from further 
relaxation in response to recognition of gay marriage. For example, 
recognition of same-sex marriage will make traditional marriage less 
popular by making it less special, less honored.85 In communities where 
marriage rates have declined, women seem to have suffered more than 
men. Many unmarried women still bear children, but they usually must 
provide the children with personal care and financial support without 
much help from the fathers. 
Further, recognizing gay marriage would alter attitudes about 
relations between spouses. Despite feminist fulminations about gender 
stereotypes, recent scientific findings confirm the existence of inherent 
differences between men and women.86 However, with validation of 
same-sex marriage, marriage will cease to be a relationship that is always 
between a man and a woman, who are inherently different; it will then be 
a relationship between any two people. The differences between men and 
women will be downplayed if not completely ignored. 
This change is likely to harm wives, especially in the context of 
divorce. Wives are more likely to have child custody after a divorce and 
lower income-earning capacity. Although marital law has often treated 
women unfairly, it now serves more to protect than to harm them. 
Further, and again contrary to the statements of some feminists, the 
religious roots of our marriage laws are helpful in this regard. 
Christianity and Judaism now generally teach that men and women have 
inherent differences but are equally valuable, equally worthy of respect.87 
At the least, traditional marriage should be supported until something 
 
 84. Wilcox, supra note 46, at 117. 
 85. It may also exacerbate the shortage of males interested in traditional marriage. Although 
the number of people whose primary sexual orientation is changed by legal validation of gay 
marriage would probably be small (see supra note 65 and accompanying text), it would probably 
include more males than females because homosexuality seems to appeal to more men than women. 
See Dent, supra note 1, at 612-14. 
 86. See STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 
344-50 (2002). 
 87. See Teresa Collett, Independence or Interdependence? A Christian Response to Liberal 
Feminists, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 75, at 178 (arguing that Christianity is quite 
compatible with “relational” or “difference” feminism, which recognizes inherent differences 
between men and women, but not with “sameness” feminism). 
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better is available. At the moment there is not even a plausible 
alternative. 
Traditional marriage also promotes class equality. Economist George 
Akerlof ascribes the economic decline of inner cities in part to 
weakening social support for marriage. The resulting changes in sexual 
morals in the 1960s and 1970s harmed poor and working people most 
because they spawned our big increase in out-of-wedlock pregnancies 
and a decline in the “shotgun” marriages that previously protected 
mothers and children in such cases.88 Recent changes in welfare 
programs may have reversed this trend, at least slightly.89 “The sexual 
revolution was less consequential for middle- and upper-class Americans 
because they retained a strong economic and social stake in the 
conventional family.”90 
G.  Bolstering Liberal Democracy 
It has already been noted that traditional marriage benefits society by 
socializing adults and improving the raising of children, which promotes 
growth of the economy.91 Despite the risk of seeming repetitious it is 
worth noting that, notwithstanding the contempt for traditional marriage 
voiced by many liberals, “many of liberalism’s most cherished values—
e.g., personal autonomy, equality, individual responsibility—depend 
upon the nuclear family for their flourishing.”92 Indeed, it now seems that 
Western civilization’s leap ahead of its competitors in the last few 
centuries, at least in terms of science and technology, economic growth, 
and cultivation of democracy and individual rights—a phenomenon 
historians have struggled to explain—stems in part from the evolution of 
the nuclear family. 
The unique genius of the family as it came to be institutionalized in the 
West is that it fostered, and continues to foster, a particular set of 
values that helped give birth to liberal modernity. . . . [I]t fostered late 
marriage and responsible procreation, parsimony and individual 
responsibility, and a measure of equality between men and women, 
along with an unusual level of independence from the extended family. 
These norms, in turn, were particularly conducive to the rise of cottage-
based capitalism and eventually industrial capitalism.93 
 
 88. Wilcox, supra note 46, at 119. 
 89. See Sawhill, supra note 44, at 89 (ascribing the “small comeback” of marriage in part to 
“the new messages embedded in welfare reform”). 
 90. Wilcox, supra note 46, at 119. 
 91. See supra notes 43-62, 69-74 and accompanying text. 
 92. Wilcox, supra note 46, at 117. 
 93. Id. at 116-17. 
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To some extent these findings are new, but they are adumbrated by 
Max Weber’s ascription of the evolution of capitalism to the Protestant 
ethic.94 What is new is the appreciation of the importance of traditional 
marriage and the nuclear family to this development. 
H.  The Importance of State Support 
Some, including many gay activists, believe that marriage should be 
treated as a private matter; it should not concern the state any more than 
other personal relationships do.95 The preceding discussion shows one 
sufficient ground for rejecting this view: marriage affects third parties or, 
as economists, say, it has externalities. The most affected third parties are 
children, but society generally has a stake in the raising of children. The 
benefits of marriage to the health, wealth and socialization of the couple 
also affect society generally because society often bears the costs of poor 
health and antisocial behavior, while tax revenues suffer from lower 
incomes. Women generally gain greater power in bargaining with men 
when marriage is honored and normative. 
Another reason also exists for this view: It is arguable that “people 
left to their own devices will not be in a position to lead the most 
valuable life available to them.”96 Indeed, “scholars are increasingly 
showing that people don’t know very well what they want, how much 
they value it, or what makes them happy.”97 Often “people do not have 
clear or well-found preferences, and hence it is unclear that people have 
straightforward ‘values’ that can actually be found.”98 To the extent that 
they do have preferences, it is questionable how much they are integral 
or essential to the individual or how much they are internally generated. 
“[W]e might say that preferences are constructed, rather than elicited, by 
social institutions.”99 
 
 94. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons 
trans. 1930). 
 95. See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (arguing for abolition of marriage as a legal category); 
Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 79 ( 2001) (arguing for treating personal relationships through contract rules modeled 
on corporate law); Tamar Lewin, For Better Or Worse: Marriage’s Stormy Future, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 23, 2003, § 4, at 1 (“The most radical structural change being discussed these days is taking the 
state out of the marriage business.”). 
 96. Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals After All, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 1350, 1365 (1991) (describing “perfectionist” theory). 
 97. See Claire A. Hill, Beyond Mistakes: The Next Wave of Behavioral Law and Economics 
4 (unpublished manuscript, on file at the Georgetown University Law Center) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=452100.; see also Jon Gertner, The Futile Pursuit of Happiness, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Sept. 7, 2003, § 6 (Magazine) at 44. 
 98. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 11, at 19. 
 99. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 38 (1997). 
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It might seem that traditional marriage and family are so deeply 
ingrained in our culture that they hardly need added government support. 
Unfortunately, much contemporary popular music, film, television and 
advertising parade a shallow hedonism that erodes respect for traditional 
marriage and family and divert us from true human flourishing. The 
financial costs of marriage and children have also increased. Society and 
the individual both need state support for traditional marriage to counter 
these forces. 
IV.  OTHER FORMS OF MARRIAGE 
Some object that this honor is denied only to gay marriages. Not 
true. Polygamy, endogamy, and marriage with minors and animals are 
also invalid and, unlike gay marriages, often criminal. Hence, rather than 
casually distributing honor to everyone but gays, the law strictly confines 
the honor of marriage to the one form that has worked best: 
monogamous, exogamous, heterosexual marriage. 
The other side of that coin is that validating gay marriage would 
logically necessitate validating these other forms of marriage. The 
accusation that Christian views on marriage are narrow and provincial is 
true—not in its rejection of gay marriage, since with rare recent 
exceptions that rejection is universal, but in its rejection of polygamy and 
endogamy, which have been common, perhaps the norm to which 
Christian views are an aberration. If two unrelated men can marry, why 
can’t two brothers marry? There certainly is no concern about birth 
defects. And if two women can marry, is it degrading to women to let 
three women marry? Could we allow only same-sex endogamous and 
polygamous marriages? This proposition would raise an equal protection 
problem, especially since we’d be sure to get a case of two 80-year old 
brothers and an 82-year old sister who wanted to marry. If we do not 
treat legal recognition of marriage as a means of conferring honor on the 
monogamous, exogamous, heterosexual marriage as the best institution 
for raising children, what objection can exist to recognizing the marriage 
of these three siblings? 
The reasoning of proponents of same-sex marriage is so broad as of 
November 28, 2003 to implicate other forms of marriage. Most treat 
same-sex marriage as falling within a broad right of privacy and 
autonomy in personal matters. Thus David A.J. Richards claims that 
sexual autonomy is central to the idea that a person is free.100 Nicholas 
Bamforth argues: “If autonomy is to be taken seriously, . . . then each 
 
 100. DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND OVERCRIMINALIZATION 53 (1982). 
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individual’s appreciation and definition of what is, for them, a valuable 
sexual act or sexual/emotional relationship must—within the limits of 
consent—be respected.”101 
However, if there is a right to sexual autonomy, it would seem to 
include polygamy, endogamy, and perhaps bestiality. The few efforts to 
distinguish these other relationships from same-sex unions have been 
embarrassingly incoherent; most proponents of same-sex marriage don’t 
even try.102 As Hadley Arkes says, “Every argument for gay marriage is 
an argument that would support polygamy.”103 
Such statements have usually been dismissed by gay activists as 
scare tactics by right wingers. Again, however, recent developments 
belie the arguments of advocates for same-sex marriage. Although 
Lawrence v. Texas dealt only with homosexual acts, this decision has 
already spawned speculation that its reasoning logically applies to many 
other activities. Noting the application of the “least restrictive means” 
standard in Lawrence, Cass Sunstein has recognized that if the 
restrictions on bestiality, polygamy, and endogamy must “be justified by 
showing that they are the least restrictive means of achieving a 
compelling state interest” then “at least some of them would be in serious 
trouble.”104 Similarly, in the wake of Lawrence Professor Brett 
McDonnell has distributed a paper entitled “Is Incest Next?”105 These 
authors are not religious reactionaries. Sunstein is a liberal and 
McDonnell is gay.106 
Some gays are honest and consistent enough to support polygamy.107 
A few years ago the New York Times reported the growing popularity of 
“polyluv.”108 America’s growing Moslem population is likely to add to 
 
 101. Bamforth, supra note 2, at 43. Supporters of gay marriage also decry doctrines of natural 
law that assert that some sexual acts and relationships are inherently better than others. See id. at 46-
53. This article does not rely on natural law doctrines, however, so this debate need not be 
addressed. 
 102. See Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. (forthcoming 2004) 
(“I find something unseemly about the efforts of many gay advocates to deny the analogy [between 
anti-sodomy and anti-incest laws]—it reeks of people who have now gained their own liberty paying 
scant heed to the liberty of others.”); see also id. at xxx n.129 (“A similar dynamic is in play as gay 
marriage advocates frequently deny the analogy to polygamy.”). 
 103. One Man, One Woman, WASHINGTON WATCH, Jan. 26, 1998, at 1. 
 104. Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and 
Marriage 32 (Sept., 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The University of Chicago Law 
School) at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=450160. 
 105. McDonnell, supra note 102. 
 106. So I infer from his reference to “my boyfriend.” Id. at xxx n.133. 
 107. See David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal 
Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 490-91 (1996) (“By ceasing to 
conceive of marriage as a partnership composed of one person of each sex, the state may become 
more receptive to units of three or more.”). 
 108. They Call It Polyluv, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1997, §6 (Magazine) at 15. 
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this support. Should we care? The standard criticism of endogamy—risk 
of genetic defects—is weak.109 Endogamy and polygamy cause concrete 
harm. Endogamy can lead to disputes and exploitation of the power of 
older family members over the younger, thereby interfering with the 
ability of the family to prepare the young to play a positive role in 
society.110 Endogamy also invites people to focus their attentions inward 
and to neglect contacts with the outside world that are crucial to their 
employment opportunities and their citizenship. 
Polygamy also causes harm. Although the definition of polygamy 
includes one woman having several husbands, or marriages among 
several women and several men, in practice polygamy almost always 
means polygyny—one man having more than one wife. A man who takes 
an additional wife is likely to pay less attention to the wife (or wives) he 
already has. The very possibility of a man taking a second wife reduces 
the bargaining power of his first wife. Under liberal divorce laws like 
contemporary America’s, she is vulnerable even if her consent is 
required before her husband can take a second wife because her husband 
can simply divorce her if she refuses to consent. 
A man who fathers children by a new wife is also likely to pay less 
attention to his children from earlier wives. Relationships are often 
difficult even among full siblings. Adding half-siblings further strains the 
family. History is full of scheming and strife among polygamous wives 
and their respective children. 
For the foregoing reasons, polygamy is usually criticized as harmful 
to women, but it may be even more harmful to men. In polygamous 
societies wealthy, powerful men accumulate wives, leaving a shortage of 
eligible women for poorer men. This situation is particularly detrimental 
to younger men, who have not yet been able to build wealth and power. 
Even when marriages are not arranged by parents, it is not surprising that 
some women would rather be the younger bride of a wealthy powerful 
man than the sole wife of a poor man who cannot provide as well for 
herself and her children. As a result, many men cannot marry until 
middle-age, if ever. 
 
 109. The probability of defects in children of first cousins is quite small. See Denise Grady, 
Few Risks Seen to the Children of 1st Cousins, N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 2002, at A1 (reporting on a 
review of six studies). Moreover, most incest and endogamy statues are overly broad in that they 
apply to many relationships with no close blood tie. See McDonnell, supra note 102. 
 110. See McDonnell, supra note 102 (“Another leading justification [of anti-incest laws] is 
protecting relations within the family from becoming over-sexualized.”). 
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A right to sexual autonomy would also seem to invalidate laws 
forbidding adultery.111 Validation of same-sex marriage would strengthen 
the argument against these laws. One reason to forbid adultery is that it 
harms children by disrupting the family.112 Since same-sex couples do 
not bear children, this justification does not apply equally to them. 
Further, if same-sex marriages were valid, the high rate of promiscuity 
among gay men would in practice make it harder to take these laws 
seriously. 
In sum, the reasons advanced by advocates of same-sex marriage 
apply equally to adultery and to other forms of marriage that most people 
(including most advocates of same-sex marriage) consider undesirable. 
That same-sex marriage gets much greater support than the other forms 
of marriage reflects political sentiments, not principle. However, judicial 
approval of same-sex marriage would have to be based on some 
principle, such as a right to sexual autonomy, which would also require 
the approval of adultery and of other forms of marriage. This approval, 
however, would compound the social damage wreaked by recognition of 
same-sex marriage. 
It need hardly be added that endogamy, polygamy, and adultery do 
not facilitate the loving, companionate marriages that most people 
consider ideal for human flourishing.113 However, many liberals and gay 
activists dismiss such beliefs as inherently religious and thus as invalid 
bases for law in a free society. 
V.  RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
Professor Destro’s contribution to this Symposium shows 
convincingly that recognition of same-sex marriage would inexorably 
lead to curbs on expression of religious beliefs,114 so I need not discuss 
that issue at length. However, the point should be briefly reiterated here 
because it is so important to negate any inference that Professor Destro’s 
views lack wide support. 
Two recent events will serve to illustrate the problem. Recently in 
Minnesota state employees were required to attend diversity training on 
homosexuality. Some employees brought their Bibles and read them 
 
 111. See Sunstein, supra note 104, at 28 (“it would be possible to urge that [in adultery] a 
consensual relationship is involved, one with which the state may not interfere on purely moral 
grounds”). 
 112. See id. (“The adultery laws can be seen as an effort to protect the marital relationship, 
involving persons and interests, including those of children, that are harmed if adultery occurs.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 113. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 114. Robert Destro, “Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom.” (Paper presented at this 
symposium). 
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silently without disrupting the training sessions. For this they were 
reprimanded. The employees sued, and federal courts held that the state 
had violated the employees’ freedoms of speech and of religion.115 
On Staten Island a Christian minister bought space on two billboards 
to display the biblical verse, “Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with 
womankind: it is an abomination.”116 The borough president called the 
billboard company and said “This message conveys an atmosphere of 
intolerance which is not welcome in our borough.” He added that the 
company “owns a number of billboards on Staten Island and derives 
substantial economic benefits from them.” Within hours the displays 
were removed. The minister sued, claiming a violation of the First 
Amendment. A federal district court dismissed the complaint on the 
ground that the display had been removed by the company, a private 
entity, and not by the government. However, the court of appeals 
reversed, because the borough president’s statement “could be found to 
contain an implicit threat of retaliation” if the display remained. 
The constitutional protection afforded in these two cases may vanish 
if same-sex marriage becomes legally valid. Government need not, and 
cannot, be neutral about moral issues.117 The state must either favor 
traditional marriage or treat it as equal to gay marriage. In either case it 
stakes out a moral position. If it takes the latter position, the law in its 
expressive function disapproves beliefs that the two are not equal, 
including Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 
Validation of same-sex marriage will also have material 
consequences. Just as government benefits are denied to organizations 
that practice racial segregation,118 government benefits will be denied to 
organizations that refuse to recognize same-sex marriages. Public school 
students who proclaim that homosexual acts are sinful may be punished 
for hate speech. 
Although compromise is not impossible, it is not morally neutral and 
will not be acceptable to those with a strong, principled commitment 
either in favor of or against equal legal treatment of same-sex marriage. 
Moreover, since religious belief is important to many Americans’ 
attitudes about homosexuality, equal respect for homosexuality cannot be 
 
 115. Altman v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 251 F.3d 1199 (8th Cir. D. Minn., 2001); see also 
Minnesota Officials Guilty of Religious Discrimination for Punishing Employees Who Brought 
Bibles to Diversity Training Sessions, AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, at 
http://www.aclj.org/news/pressreleases/020802_diversity_training_victory.asp. 
 116. Leviticus 18:22. The story is taken from Clyde Haberman, All the Views Unfit to Print on 
a Billboard, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2003, at A21. 
 117. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 118. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding withdrawal 
of tax exempt status from school because it forbade interracial dating). 
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achieved without serious governmental curbs on expressions of 
traditional religious beliefs. 
VI.  DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS 
Recognition of domestic partnerships could erode the respect for and 
the popularity of marriage. In France such recognition seems to have had 
this effect.119 Traditionally, one is married or single; there are no other 
options. Domestic partnership laws eliminate this bright-line dichotomy. 
These laws offer an alternative that can avoid the lingering taint of 
“living in sin” without marriage and of bearing illegitimate children, 
bastards, out of wedlock. Already employers are being pressured to drop 
references to an employee’s “spouse” in favor of “partner” or 
“significant other.”120 Given the importance of marriage for the 
protection of children,121 a strong presumption should exist against steps 
that weaken marriage. 
On the other side, no pressing need exists for the material benefits 
the validation of domestic partnerships would confer. As already noted, 
even the legal benefits of marriage are minor and can often be attained 
by private action.122 Not surprisingly, where domestic partnership laws 
have been enacted, few gay couples have used them.123 If specific 
problems of gay couples exist that deserve legal attention, these 
problems can be addressed by specific legislation. 
VII.  THE NEED FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
Despite the many recent changes that impinge on the debate over 
same-sex marriage, until recently no American court has ordered 
government to give legal recognition to same-sex marriage. Further, 
Congress has adopted the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which 
provides that (1) for purposes of federal law marriage means only a 
marriage of one man and one woman, and (2) states are not required to 
 
 119. See Chris Crain, Editorial, Gays May Ruin “Traditional Marriage,” N.Y. BLADE, Aug. 3, 
2001, at 14 (“The effect on ‘traditional marriage’ has been dramatic. In France, where [domestic 
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 120. See BRIAN MCNAUGHT, GAY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE 50 (1993) (recommending such 
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 121. See supra notes 43-62 and accompanying text. 
 122. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 123. By the end of 1997 fewer than 300 couples had registered under Hawaii’s domestic 
partnership law, and about 25% of these were siblings or elderly parents and adult children. See 
Susan Essoyan, Hawaii Finds Slow Response to Domestic Partners Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
Dec. 28, 1997, at A5, available at 1997 WL 16187525. 
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recognize any other kind of marriage even if it has been legally validated 
by a sister state.124 
These facts were recited by some advocates of same-sex marriage to 
prove no imminent threat to traditional marriage exists.125 That argument 
was clearly exploded when the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
commanded the state to honor gay marriages.126 Some foreign countries, 
including Canada, now recognize same-sex marriages. Gay couples 
married in these jurisdictions will seek recognition of their marriages by 
other states and the federal government. 
Some argue that if the citizens of any state are unhappy with a 
judicial order to recognize gay marriages, the people can simply amend 
the state constitution. However, in many states the procedure for 
amending the state constitution is so tortuous that even a substantial 
majority may be unable to achieve an amendment. Moreover, a state 
constitutional amendment will not protect a state from having to 
recognize same-sex marriages validated in its sister states or in foreign 
countries. States may not have to recognize gay marriages either because 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution127 does 
not compel it or because DOMA overrides the residual constitutional 
rule.128 However, it has been argued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
would demand recognition and that Congress cannot by legislation alter 
this demand.129 
Accordingly, the only reliable measure for avoiding validation of gay 
marriage is a federal constitutional amendment. However, many argue 
that marriage is an area traditionally relegated to state law; therefore, a 
federal constitutional amendment defining marriage would be 
incompatible with federalism.130 That argument would be persuasive if 
states validated gay marriage by democratic means, but that is most 
unlikely. Rather, validation is likely to be imposed by judicial fiat over 
 
 124. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
 125. Carl Hulse, House Panel Is Told ‘96 Law Protects States on Marriage, N.Y TIMES, 
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the opposition of most citizens. In this case a federal constitutional 
amendment does not clash with the purposes of federalism. This article is 
not the place for a discussion of the desirability of the proposed Federal 
Marriage Amendment, but some constitutional response is needed. 
